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• OVERVIEW: TCE AND COSTS
• FINDING TRANSACTION 





• TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
(TCE)
– MAKE OR BUY, AND ASSOCIATED 
DIFFICULTIES
• OUR VIEW OF TCE AND COST 
ESTIMATION
4ENTERING HYPOTHESIS
• …namely cost drivers are more complex than 
current methodology considers.
• Cost = f(“Production” Costs,Transaction Costs)
– Production Costs = g(WBS, systems 
integration)
– Transaction Costs = Coordination and 
Motivation Costs
• Can a more complete view of costs improve cost 
estimation methodology?
5Transaction Cost Economics
• STUDY OF “VERTICAL” FIRM BOUNDARIES
• KEY PARTS OF WORLD VIEW
– MARKETPLACE IS NOT A FRICTIONLESS, 
COSTLESS MEDIUM
– ENTERPRISES ARE A NETWORK OF 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
(TRANSACTIONS)
– THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTIONS 
DETERMINES THE VERTICAL 
BOUNDARIES (INDICATES WHETHER TO 
MAKE OR BUY)
• A WELL-DEVELOPED FIELD OF STUDY
6BASIC RULE FOR MAKE-OR-
BUY DECISION
• BUY (OUTSOURCE) IF
INTERNAL COSTS > OUTSOURCED COSTS
• INTERNAL COSTS = PRODUCTION
COSTS + “AGENCY” COSTS
• OUTSOURCED COSTS = PRODUCTION 
COSTS + “TRANSACTION” COSTS
7STARTING POINTS
• AGENCY THEORY (including the 
Principal-Agent Problem)
• TRANSACTIONS COST ECONOMICS 
(TCE)
– “VERTICAL” BOUNDARIES OF THE 
FIRM: what to produce within firm 
boundaries.
• COMPETITIVE SOURCING, e.g., A-76
8THE PROMISE OF OUTSOURCING
• LOWER PRODUCTION COSTS IN THE 
GENERAL MARKETPLACE
– COMPETITIVE FIRMS ARE HIGHLY 
EFFICIENT
– … AND PASS THOSE RESULTS ON TO 
THEIR CUSTOMERS (P ≈ MC)
• LESSENING “AGENCY” COSTS
– REMINDER OF CONTESTABILITY
9THE FUNDAMENTAL 
TRANSFORMATION
• SOME OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS 
LEAVE THE COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE
• IN PARTICULAR, RELATION-SPECIFIC 
INVESTMENTS REMOVE ALTERNATIVE 
TRADING PARTNERS
¾STARTING WITH COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
CAN LEAD TO BILATERAL MONOPOLY AS A 
RESULT
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TCE AND THE PERILS OF 
OURSOURCING
• TRANSACTIONS COSTS ARISE FROM 
VARIOUS SOURCES
– COORDINATING ACTIVITIES
– SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE INFORMATION
– MOTIVATING EFFORTS FOR MUTUAL INTEREST
¾RISKS TO BOTH PARTIES OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP
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MOTIVATION: Avoiding Opportunistic 
Behavior & Hold Up
• OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR: “Self-interest 
seeking with guile …” (Williamson)
– Also defined as unproductive bargaining or “rent-
seeking” activities.
• HOLDUP: being forced to accept worse terms 
through renegotiation with a partner who 
threatens to terminate the relationship. 
¾Bilateral bargaining can dissipate or even 
eliminate any gains from a transaction.
12
ADDRESSING THE HOLDUP 







– “GOCO” PHYSICAL ASSETS
¾COSTLY ACTIONS WHICH DISSIPATE 



























– RED: ONE QUALIFIED SUPPLIER 
– GREEN: MANY AVAILABLE SUPPLIERS 
• COMPLEXITY
– RED: LARGE SCALE, SPECIALIZED SKILLS
– GREEN: ROUTINE TASK OR STANDARD 
PRODUCT
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EX ANTE INDICATORS II
• LENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP
– RED: LONG-TERM, HARD TO FORESEE 
PROBLEMS
– GREEN: SERIES OF SEPARATE TRANSACTIONS
• FREQUENCY
– RED: SPECIALIZED TASK WITH SIGNIFICANT 
LEARNING BY DOING
– GREEN: ROUTINE, STANDARD TASK. 
WIDESPREAD LEARNING BY DOING
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EX ANTE INDICATORS III
• TIME SENSITIVITY
– RED: TIMELY, SHORT-FUSED PERFORMANCE 
HIGHLY IMPORTANT
– GREEN: NON-TIMELY PERFORMANCE CAUSES 
INCONVENIENCE
• OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
– RED: UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE 
DEGRADES READINESS OR SAFETY
– GREEN: UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE 
CAUSES INCONVENIENCE
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Getting Good Data: 
A Tale of (mostly) Frustration
• HOW TO MEASURE TRANSACTION 
COSTS? (or what would be a good proxy?)
– Program Management Office (PMO) costs 




• Consolidated Acquisition Reporting 
System (CARS)
– Includes information from Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR) and Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES)
• Budget Item Justification sheets 
– OSD budget
• Cost Data Summary Report (DD 1921)
– Contract WBS elements
19
Problems with Existing Data I
• SAR and DAES do not contain the level of 
detail necessary to identify PMO costs
• OSD budget is not consistent in reporting 
PMO costs across programs and years
• Information in CARS does not always 
track to OSD budget
– SAR only includes the six largest active 
contracts
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Problems with Existing Data II
• CDSR (1921) categories are not 
consistent across programs or contractors
– Program Management (non-ILS)
– Program Management (ILS)
– System Engineering & Program Management 
(SEMP)
• System Engineering (Management)
• Program Management









• Consistently on 
schedule, on budget
• No major issues
JAVELIN
Ex Ante: 1 Red, 
4 Yellow
Progress
• Nunn-McCurdy breach, 
behind schedule
















































































WHAT DATA WOULD WE COLLECT 
FOR TRANSACTION COSTS?
• MORE STANDARDIZED 
MEASUREMENT OF TRANSACTION-
COST AVOIDANCE MEASURES
• CONTRACT NEGOTIATION AND 
ADJUDICATION
• TAPERED INTEGRATION




• ADD TO BODY OF CASE STUDIES
– FOCUS ON EX ANTE INDICATORS AND 
PROGRAM HISTORY VS. EX POST COST, 
SCHEDULE OR PERFORMANCE SHORTCOMINGS 
• CONTINUE EXAMINING SEMP RATIO AS 
INDICATOR OF TRANSACTION COSTS
• RUN A PROTOTYPE CALCULATION OF 
TRANSACTIONS COST FOR ONE PROGRAM
